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Introduction
All is not well in the land of Internet trademark law. Namely, the
concurrent use doctrine is in need of an updated analysis, and fast.
Generally, in the United States, the first user to either use a mark in
commerce or file an intent to use application with the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") has the ultimate right to use and register
the trademark. This is called the "first to use" doctrine, and it is in
contrast to most other nations which maintain a "first to register"
system. Out of the first to use system sprang the common law doctrine
of concurrent use. The concurrent use doctrine allows different
owners to use the same or similar marks in commerce under certain
circumstances. This common law doctrine was codified into the
Lanham Act in 1946 in section 1052(d).'
Whether a subsequent adopter of a mark, the "junior user" or
"subsequent user," may concurrently use a trademark already in
existence for the same class of goods or services depends on two
primary considerations. First, the junior user must be using the mark
in a geographically remote area in relation to the area in which the
first user, the "senior user," is doing business. Second, the junior user
must have adopted the mark in good faith. In a shrinking majority of
jurisdictions, good faith means the subsequent user must have
adopted the mark without actual knowledge of the first user's mark.2
In a minority of jurisdictions, good faith means that even if the
subsequent user knew about the first user's mark, the junior user
adopted the mark without the intention to palm off their goods as the
senior user's goods.3 The role that "good faith" plays in the
concurrent use doctrine to determine common law rights should not
be confused with the role that "good faith" plays in the analysis of a
junior user's defense to the senior user's claim of incontestability4 or
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2001).
2. See Money Store v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 1982);
Weiner King, Inc. v. Weiner King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 522-23 n. 6 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1980)
(holding that actual notice is sufficient to support bad faith).
3. See GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541-42 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied,
498 U.S. 998 (1990); ACCU Personnel, Inc. v. AccuStaff, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1191, 1210-11
(D. Del. 1994).
4. This is termed the "limited area" defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2001)
(requiring "[t]hat the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been continuously used
by such party"); see also Members First Fed. Credit Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit
Union, 54 F. Supp. 2d 393,407 (M.D. Pa. 1999) ("[O]nce a mark becomes incontestable, its
registration constitutes conclusive evidence of the mark's validity, the registrant's
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the "good faith" element of the likelihood of confusion test.5 This
paper does borrow the reasoning of the two latter lines of cases in
order to develop certain arguments.
It is now the Information Age and the Internet has become an
increasingly common information repository shared by many
individuals. This instant interconnection of individuals and businesses
now threatens the basis on which the concurrent use doctrine rests;
i.e., ignorance of another's mark due to geographic distance and the
overlap of remote territories due to the Internet. The increasing
commercial use of the Internet gives rise to the possibility that the
Internet may effectively give at least some degree of notice to any
subsequent user that another person is using the text-based
trademark in question.6
This article examines the two critical aspects of the concurrent
use doctrine as it relates to a company's presence on the World Wide
Web ("web"): geographic limitations and the innocent adoption of a
mark. Part I gives a brief history of concurrent use. Part II discusses
the role that web advertising and websites have on the geographic
limitations imposed upon concurrent users. Part III discusses the
junior user's good faith requirement and the notion that domain
names and web presence may be considered notice to subsequent
users of the same or similar marks. Part IV discusses the need for
eliminating the geographic component of the concurrent use doctrine
in order to provide simplicity and stability in the law, as well as a
future for this legal doctrine.
I
Brief History of Concurrent Use
Concurrent use of trademarks doctrine is largely unique to the
United States' legal system. The doctrine arose out of a first-to-use
legal environment steeped in the convenience of having a large
country. This made it possible for different users to create the same
or similar mark independently - both parties being ignorant as to the
other's use of the mark in commerce. The courts created a doctrine
that did not punish the subsequent user of a mark if the subsequent
ownership of the mark in commerce, subject only to the § 1115(b) defenses.").
5. See Brookfield Commun., Inc. v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1999).
6. This notice is similar in some respects to the constructive notice that a registered
trademark gives to any junior user. It is important to note at the outset that although
trademarks can take the form of symbols, designs, and logos, this article refers only to text
trademarks unless otherwise noted.
user conducted business in a geographically remote area and adopted
the mark innocently and in good faith. The concurrent use doctrine is
the result of a court's desire to find an equitable balance between
trademark users and the buyers of the goods or services.
Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co. is the seminal
case regarding concurrent use.8 In that case, an Illinois corporation,
Hanover Star Milling Company ("Hanover"), manufactured flour and
sold it to numerous New England states under the name of "Tea
Rose."9 Hanover brought a trademark infringement action against
Metcalf, a seller of flour in several southern states under the same
name." The United States Supreme Court determined that although
the defendant began using the name "Tea Rose" after the plaintiff
first used it, Metcalf was not aware of this fact, and the areas each
party did business in were geographically remote from each other."
The Court held that "where two parties independently are employing
the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets
that are wholly remote from one another, the question of prior
appropriation is legally insignificant.,
12
The Court offered conflicting guidance as to the degree of
knowledge needed to constitute good faith adoption of a mark. The
Court stated in one part of the opinion that a junior user who adopted
the mark in "perfect good faith, with no knowledge that anybody else
was using" the mark was a good faith user..3 Later, the Court stated
that where two users of the same mark are in remote markets, the
junior user may keep its trademark and trade market, "unless, at
least, it appear[s] that the second adopter has selected the mark with
some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as to take
the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall the extension of
his trade, or the like."' 4
Two years later, in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the concurrent use
7. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition Vol. 3
§ 20.84 (4th ed. 1996).
8. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
9. Id. at 405-07.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 419-21.
12. Id. at 415.
13. Id. at 412. It may be that the Court was not establishing "no knowledge" as the
bottom-line standard, but merely that "no knowledge" was definitely sufficient for good
faith.
14. Id. at 415.
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doctrine. 5 In Rectanus, a Massachusetts resident made and
distributed a medicine labeled "Rex."16 This use first started in 1877;
the person registered the word "Rex" under the laws of
Massachusetts in 1898 and with the United States Patent Office. in
1900.17 Thereafter the business began to expand nationally."
Meanwhile, around 1883, Theodore Rectanus, a druggist in
Louisville, Kentucky, began employing the word "Rex" in relation to
other medicines distributed in and around Louisville only. 9 The
plaintiff Massachusetts company eventually entered the Louisville
market with several "Rexall" stores.' A shipment of Rex-labeled
drugs was shipped to the Louisville market;' litigation followed
thereafter." The Court stated that because the defendant did not
know of plaintiff's prior use of the mark "Rex" and Louisville was
remote to plaintiff's geographic area of use, the defendant was not
enjoined from using the mark in the Louisville area.'
The concurrent use doctrine outlined by these two cases is
known as the "Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine," herein simply referred
to as "concurrent use" doctrine. The concurrent use doctrine governs
territorial rights in unregistered trademarks. This doctrine was
entrenched in common law by the time it was first codified in 1946
with the passage of the Lanham Act.,3 The Lanham Act tried to
dispense with the "good faith" defense by establishing constructive
notice to all subsequent users of a registered mark.24 The Lanham Act
allows subsequent users to register ,trademarks as long as there is
."concurrent lawful use" of the mark prior to registration.25
Registration freezes the nonregistered concurrent user to the markets
in which it is doing business at the time of the registration application,
and it only extends exclusive use nationwide to goods -and services
indicated in the registration certificate.26
15. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
16. Id. at 94.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 103.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.; see also Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 613 n. 7 (2d
Cir. 1960); Old Dutch Foods, Inc. v. Dan Dee Pretzel & Potato Chip Co., 477 F.2d 150, 156
(6th Cir. 1973).
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II
Geographic Remoteness
The geographic remoteness requirement is just as it sounds - the
trademarks must operate in physically separated trade markets. The
first step in determining remoteness is to ask whether one of the
trademarks at issue is nationally registered. At the time of filing for a
trademark registration, the filing party establishes nationwide rights
to use the mark except in the areas where the other user already
operates, and registration triggers a different analysis than the one
discussed in this paper.27
Assuming that there is no registration, the next step is to
determine whether either the junior or senior user's mark in question
require secondary meaning. Here the analysis dovetails. If a mark is
not inherently distinctive, then a secondary meaning must be
established before the courts determine in which markets the
trademark has established common law rights.28 If no secondary
meaning can be established, then no trademark rights will flow to the
area where there is no secondary meaning. If secondary meaning can
be established, then the analysis merges with that analysis applied to
inherently distinctive marks.
Inherently distinctive marks may have one or more of the
judicially created tests applied to the trademark's commercial activity
in order to determine in which markets the user has rights.
The courts do not grant a geographically based trade market to
more than one trademark user.29 Three tests have developed to
determine whether a certain geographic area is included within a
party's exclusive territory: (1) market penetration, (2) reputation, and
(3) zone of natural expansion." Jurisdictions are split and even
27. There is authority that states that even though a senior user has registered the
mark, the senior user may not obtain an injunction against the junior user in those markets
where the senior user has not yet penetrated. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
28. This forces the question as to whether there is a difference in the amount of
business activity needed to prove secondary meaning and the amount of business activity
needed to establish sufficient market penetration. There is some authority that states that
a greater quantum of evidence is needed to establish a secondary meaning than for market
penetration. See Adray v. Adray-Mart, Inc., 68 F.3d 362 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995), amended on
other grounds, 76 F.3d 984, 989 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying the automatic guarantee of
sufficient market penetration needed to establish common law rights when secondary
meaning is established).
29. Note that exactly the same trademark can coexist in the same physical territory
as long as the class of goods the mark is identified with is different and there will be no
likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods.
30. Reputation is a factor to be considered in the market penetration test, but
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confused about which test to use, but the courts apply either one or
more of the tests.
The market penetration test is the traditional and widely used
test. It measures the amount of actual sales, advertising, and
reputation the senior user has established for a trademark in a
particular trade market at the time the junior user has applied for
registration with the PTO. An off-shoot of the market penetration
test is the reputation test. It has been described as closely related to
the market penetration test,31 and it is typically used when sales in a
market are nonexistent or de minimis. The test measures the degree
to which consumers in a market associate the mark with the good or
service and its origin. The third test, the zone of natural expansion
test, is not widely accepted. It is typically used when there are neither
actual sales nor an established reputation in a market, but instead it is
invoked when the court feels that the senior user of a mark should be
granted room to expand into a certain area or if the court concludes
that the business was likely to have expanded there.
The next section examines the extent to which Internet sales,
Internet advertising, and web presence contribute to the
establishment of sufficient market penetration and reputation and
whether the courts can use them to establish a zone of natural
expansion into a geographic location.
A. Establishing Territorial Rights With the Market Penetration Test
As mentioned earlier, there is a distinction between marks that
require secondary meaning and those that do not. If a mark requires
the establishment of secondary meaning, the general rule is that
territorial rights cannot be established unless and until the mark
acquires secondary meaning. This paper assumes that the trademarks
in question have acquired secondary meaning or are inherently
distinctive. Dispersed throughout are discussions regarding how
Internet business activity may encroach upon another user's territory
and trigger an infringement.
1. Minimum Sales Volume
The traditional market penetration test examines the degree to
which a mark has been commercially used in a particular geographic
area. There are a number of factors that the courts use when
reputation alone can be sufficient to establish common law rights. See McCarthy, supra n.
7, at § 26:16 (describing the reputation test).
31. Id. ("Reputation is an arm of the market penetration test.").
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determining whether a trademarked product has sufficiently
penetrated a market so as to include that area within the trademark's
geographic coverage. Adding confusion to this test, a few courts have
"market penetration" tests, but which are arguably an amalgam of the
market penetration and zone of natural expansion tests, or the
market penetration and reputation tests.32
The Eighth Circuit case, Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc.," established
four factors relevant to whether a mark has sufficiently penetrated a
market. The court said to consider everything, but to emphasize: (1)
the senior user's dollar value of sales at the time the junior user enters
the market; (2) the number of customers serviced by the senior user
in the area compared to the area's total population; (3) the senior
user's relative and potential growth in sales; and (4) the length of time
since significant sales were achieved in the area." The Appeals Court
remanded the issue as to whether the senior user had established
market penetration using these factors.35 When the trial court
determined that most of the states at issue were deemed to be within
the senior user's territory,36 it went up on appeal again.37 The Appeals
Court reversed and announced that none of the states were within the
senior user's territory. The court seemed to focus more on the
amount of sales generated above all other considerations. 9 The court
32. For example, Weiner King, Inc. outlined the relevant factors as follows: the
party's (1) previous business activity; (2) previous expansion or lack thereof; (3)
dominance of contiguous areas; (4) presently-planned expansion; and, where applicable,
(5) possible market penetration by means of products brought in from other areas. 615
F.2d. at 523. In Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Roots, the Third Circuit established a four factor
test: (1) the volume of sales of the trademarked product; (2) the growth trends (both
positive and negative) in the area; (3) the number of persons actually purchasing the
product in relation to the potential number of customers; and (4) the amount of product
advertising in the area. 760 F.2d 1383, 1398-99 (3d Cir. 1984); see generally William J.
Cross, Student Author, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44 U. Miami L. Rev.
1075, 1103 (1990) (stating that there is confusion surrounding the appropriate terminology
for the different tests); see also Adray, 76 F.3d at 989; Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community
College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1028 (11th Cir. 1989); Minuteman Press Intl., Inc. v. Minute-
Men Press, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 426, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Pedi-Care, Inc. v. Pedi-A-care
Nursing, Inc., 656 F. Supp 449, 454 (D. N.J. 1987); Quality Cts. United, Inc. v. Quality Cts.,
Inc., 140 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Pa. 1956). Some courts use all three tests because of the
uncertainty surrounding the proper test to use. See e.g. Laurel Capital Group, Inc. v. BT
Fin. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 469,482 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
33. 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. at 929.
35. Id. at 923.
36. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
37. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923.
38. See generally Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 436 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1971).
39. Id. at 708-09.
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mentioned the population of all the states, but with regard to a few of
the smaller states that the court said were close calls, it made no
comment as to the significance the population played in the analysis.'
Aggregating the amount of sales is not the only method of
analyzing market penetration. In Wrist-Rocket Manufacturing Co. v.
Saunders Archery Co., the Eighth Circuit considered the ratio of state
population to units sold in that state as another aspect of market
penetration analysis.41 The Third Circuit in Natural Footwear changed
the Sweetarts' rule by eliminating the time element and adding
"amount of product advertising, '' 2 while another Third Circuit case
considered the market share of the trademarked goods.43
In the Information Age, the new question for the courts is to
what degree the Internet affects these market penetration analyses
regarding sales volume. The answer is, very little. The one constant
through most of these methods of measuring market penetration is
the straightforward nature of the required information; specifically,
the total amount of sales, number of customers, and population. Sales
via the Internet can be logged like any other transaction. The more
difficult aspect of measuring market penetration is through the last
factor of the Natural Footwear case: the amount of advertising. This
analysis is examined under the reputation test section that follows.
The non-geographic nature of the Internet cannot readily help a
vendor determine where its Internet advertising is being viewed
unless website operators keep track of the IP addresses" of the
visitors. These IP addresses have geographical information integrated
into its number sequence. But, this is not currently a reliable way to
determine the exact location of the visitor because of the proliferation
of proxy servers that make anonymous users and Internet Service
Providers who reserve blocks of IP addresses for use by their dial-up
customers. Locating a visitor's physical locale may be possible and
useful if the user has a connection to the Internet by a method that
40. Id. at 708.
41. 578 F.2d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1978) (setting the ratio of 20,000 persons to one sale
as the threshold for sufficient market penetration). This per se rule was later rejected by
another circuit in Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 474
(3d Cir. 1990).
42. 760 F.2d at 1399.
43. Charles Jacquin et Cie., 921 F.2d at 474.
44. An IP address is a "32-bit numeric address written as four numbers separated by
periods." Webopedia, IP address <http://webopedia.internet.com/term/i/ipaddress.html>
(accessed Feb. 1, 2001). The number identifies a particular computer network and every
computer network connected with the Internet has a registered IP address. See id.
requires their computer to have a unique IP address.45 Before
advertising is discussed, the nature of websites and the role they play
in the market penetration test will be addressed.
2. Passive Versus Active Web Sites
In personal jurisdiction cases involving websites and the degree
of contact the websites provide with the chosen forum, the courts
have concluded that the nature and type of website activity matters.46
The question here is whether the nature and type of website activity
should contribute to the non-advertising market penetration tests.
There are three types of website activities: passive, active, and
partially active. Passive presence typically means that a website
presents basic information to the visitor regarding the products and
business. A passive site is neither a conduit for business nor is it a
means of directly communicating with the company. At the other end
of the spectrum is the active website. An active website is a facilitator
of business and provides a means of communicating (automated or
not). In the middle of these two types is the partially active website.
At the very least, a partially active website provides some degree of
business facilitation or direct communication with a company's
individuals or computers.
Analogizing to personal jurisdiction cases is helpful because a
"contact" is conceptually similar to a penetration of a particular
geographic location. The mere fact that a website is accessible from a
particular location does not constitute a contact with the forum.47
With passive sites, there is no penetrating business activity. As
was said in one jurisdiction case, simply maintaining a passive website
does not mean the site owner is deliberately directing business
45. There are commercial services that can track the geographic location of a visitor.
See Cyrica, Inc. <http://www.cyrica.com> (accessed Feb. 1, 2001).
46. See generally CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Cybersell,
Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding jurisdiction despite evidence of any actual
transactions with forum residents, browsers were encouraged to add their address to a
mailing list that basically subscribed the user to the service); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding purposeful availment based
on Dot Coin's interactive website and contracts with 3000 individuals and seven Internet
access providers in Pennsylvania allowing them to download the electronic messages that
form the basis of the suit).
47. See Jewish Defense Org., Inc., v. Super. Ct., 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1060 (1999)
(citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct., 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Creating a site,
like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide or even
worldwide - but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum
state.")).
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activity, i.e., trademarked goods or services, to a specific geographic
location.48 This logic fits nicely within the market penetration test
because a passive site does not "push" a trademark into a trade
market.
Active and partially active sites require more sophisticated
handling because there are many ways a site can interact with a
visitor; e.g., downloading files, filling out online forms, directly
emailing site operators, consummating a contract,49 or subscribing to
an email list. One possible analysis can differentiate the types of
interactivity as either primarily advertising or primarily sales
oriented. Interactivity that is primarily advertising is dealt with in Part
II(B).
As for primarily sales oriented interaction, the analysis again
dovetails. Recall that the issue here regarding concurrent use is
whether the visitor's interaction with the website can either (i)
contribute to the aggregate actions necessary for the business to
establish sufficient market penetration within the visitor's geographic
market; or (ii) if there already exists a confusingly similar trademark
within the visitor's geographic market, whether the visitor's
interaction constitutes an infringement by the remote business'
trademark in the visitor's physical locale.
Establishing market penetration of a physical locale by a
trademark on a website via primarily sales oriented interactions will
first be discussed. An interaction may be with an individual or an
automated system. An individual or computer that responds to any
visitor's attempt at communication or transaction should be held to
the same standard as is applied to non-Internet concurrent use cases.
The courts primarily emphasize total sales and the number of
customers. How these sales evolved is not influential when
determining the degree of market penetration in a geographic area.
So, in the case of establishing market penetration, active and partially
active sites, like passive sites, are not pertinent to the market
penetration test. In essence, the courts' discussion revolves primarily
around the product: (1) how many units entered the market; (2) the
total cost outlay; (3) over what amount of time was the product
imported; (4) the ratio of the product per population; and (5) the
market share of the product. Note that how the deals were
48. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419.
49. It may be arguable that merely logging on to the site and proceeding to examine
the site is an implied contract that entering the site subjects the visitor to any presented
advertisements and material. And since a website is an advertisement, business activity
occurs.
consummated does not enter the equation.
However, violating another user's territory via primarily sales
oriented interactions does implicate website business activity. This
should hold true when the interaction is directly with an individual or
an automated system. The crux of trademark law is whether there is a
likelihood of confusion between two trademarks. Whether the owner
of the encroaching mark actually knew about the other mark is not
important." As is discussed later, knowledge is important only when
first determining a mark's geographic coverage. Because knowledge
is of no import, whether the territory is being penetrated is by
automated system is irrelevant.
The final step in this analysis is to determine what type of
primarily sales oriented interaction is an actual penetration of a
visitor's geographic market. Many types of interactions exist, but the
market penetration analysis is more or less the same as the traditional
concurrent use analysis utilized by the courts.
B. Establishing Territorial Rights with the Reputation Test
The preceding section noted that the reputation test is closely
linked to market penetration analysis. Instead of measuring the
amount of goods, the reputation analysis examines the amount of
advertising and its resulting effect on a trademark's reputation.
Courts have held that national advertising51 and mail order
businesses" can establish a reputation in areas where a good or
service has not been sold. Advertising must "distinguish the marked
goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the
adopter of the mark."53 Essentially, "extensive advertising and
50. See Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir.
1991) (A showing of intent or bad faith is unnecessary to establish a violation of §
1141(a).). While a knowing adoption of a mark raises a presumption of confusion, Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Seghieri, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1956 (N.D. Cal. 1993), an innocent state of mind
is irrelevant on the issue of likelihood of confusion because the lack of intent to deceive
does nothing to alleviate the confusion created, Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1993). However, in determining likelihood of confusion in a
trademark infringement action, a court must consider following factors: strength of
plaintiff's mark: similarity between plaintiff's mark and allegedly infringing mark;
similarity between products and services offered by plaintiff and defendant; similarity of
sales methods, i.e., retail outlets or customer; similarity of advertising methods;
defendant's intent; and actual confusion. Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)
(West 1998).
51. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1052.
52. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Knox, 93 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1937); see also Benioff
v. Benioff, 222 P. 835 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1923).
53. New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 1951); see
also Warnervision, 915 F. Supp. at 645.
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promotional activities may" build a reputation and be sufficient to
establish common-law trademark rights. 4
1. Advertising on the Web
The difficulty in stating how the law stands with respect to the
level of advertising sufficient for establishing common law rights is
that the size of the geographic market can be defined in numerous
ways. State, city, or county boundaries have often been utilized.
There is no set threshold establishing an amount of advertising that
the court defines as sufficient penetration.
The Natural Footwear market penetration test presents an
"Internet-unique" problem because it examines the amount of
advertising in an area which is akin to the degree of established
reputation. This is articulated in Hanover Star:
Into whatever markets the use of a trademark has extended,
or its meaning has become known, there will the
manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an
infringing use be entitled to protection and redress.55
Determining the geographic scope of trademark rights based on
advertising is fact specific. The "market area" is the region from
which the business draws its customers. 6 A few courts have
demarcated the geographic scope based on municipal, state, or
politically established boundaries. 7 The courts have even defined
markets within cities using streets.8 Most courts reject this method
and demarcate the scope according to the markets penetrated, and in
so doing the courts look to the factors regarding the channels of trade
used and the distribution methods utilized. Regardless of the
method used, courts must examine whether the user of a mark has
54. Warnervision, 915 F. Supp. at 645 (citing New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d
1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979)).
55. 240 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
56. See Rudolph Callaman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks, and
Monopolies § 20.48,544-50 (4th ed. 1999).
57. See e.g. Younker v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 191 N.E.2d 145, 151-54 (1963)
(Raft, C.J., and Matthias, J., concurring part and dissenting in part from the judgment);
Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 224 F.2d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1955); W. Refining Co. v. Jones, 27
F.2d 205, 205 (6th Cir. 1928).
58. See e.g. Pioneer Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Pioneer Finance and Thrift Co., 417
P.2d 121, 122-23 (1966); Alexander's Dept. Stores v. Rapoport, 113 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719-20
(1952).
59. See Wrist Rocket Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Saunders Archery Co., 578 F.2d 727, 732 (8th
Cir. 1978).
established a well-known reputation. For this, courts also examine the
nature, distribution, and duration of advertising.
The problem with the reputation analysis is the overlap between
cyberspace and "realspace ' 6" reputation. Making individuals aware of
a product via Internet advertising still results in building a reputation
like any other product advertised by the traditional media. Should
realspace and cyberspace be segmented so that they are distinct
markets? If the law will not segment the two media, then how does a
court gage where reputation is being built in geographically distinct
markets by advertising in cyberspace? After all, the court cannot
merely dismiss the effects of Internet advertising.
Internet advertising can generate a realspace reputation similar
to that created by traditional media. In fact, if a site has mostly local
content, Internet advertising might be treated similarly to print
media. The circulation of the printed version is analogous to the
number of "hits," i.e., visitors, to a website. Websites predominantly
targeted at a national audience can be treated similarly to national
media.
a. "Where" a Trademark is Advertised in Cyberspace
It should be kept in mind that this article deals exclusively with
the effect of Internet advertising on a trademark's geographic
remoteness. It has been argued that "virtual" markets can be
discerned in various ways, thereby allowing the concurrent use
doctrine to survive in cyberspace. What is missing from those
discussions is the effect that Internet presence has on geographic
markets. This next section offers one of several methods to help
answer two important questions: (1) how to determine which
geographic area has been impacted by Internet advertising, and (2)
how to establish the boundaries of the geographic markets that have
been affected.
With regards to the "where" portion of the analysis, the courts
have already spoken that geography is irrelevant to the Internet.6"
Because the element of "remoteness" has always been applied to the
60. For the purpose of this article, "Realspace" is defined as the physical world,
whereas "cyberspace" is "primarily used to refer to the digital world constructed by
computer networks, in particular the Internet." <http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?
term=cyberspace> (accessed Mar. 25, 2002).
61. However, the courts do compare the Internet architecture to geography. See
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) ("Cyberspace undeniably reflects some form of
geography; chat rooms and Web sites, for example, exist at fixed "locations" on the
Internet... it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for
identity, making cyberspace more like the physical world.").
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geographic sense of the word and it is necessary to establish
concurrent use, courts can either disregard it for cyberspace analysis,
presume remoteness, or use a proxy for geography. Under the current
Internet architecture (technically speaking), a feasible proxy that
establishes a nexus between realspace geography and cyberspace is
the nature of a website's target audience. Even though most
businesses welcome global attention, it would be incorrect to assume
that all websites target a global audience. Many websites will not be
of much use to non-local individuals. In other words, there is a
difference between global viewers and global purchasers. The target
audience can be surmised by easy to cumulate data, e.g., the nature of
the business, the nature and characteristics of the typical purchaser,
local hits in proportion to global hits, location of consumer
purchasers, and the location of buyers of advertising on the website.
Several advertising situations may arise: a geographically remote
or Internet-only business that advertises on (1) a national, non-local
content website, (2) an exclusively local-content website, and (3) a
combination national and local-content website.62 Although Internet
businesses welcome global attention, the content may be targeted at a
specific audience.63 For example, many newspapers have websites,
and within the website there may be web pages devoted to classified
advertising. Like its print counterpart, many transactions are
expected to take place locally, e.g., renting an apartment or selling a
car. It is therefore arguable that persons utilizing the online classified
advertising are local persons. The courts have used the "target
audience" analysis of certain advertising media as a limiting factor.6
If a remote user chooses to advertise on the online version, this might
infringe on the local area's trademark already in use there. The nexus
between cyberspace and realspace is therefore website content. A
clearer example is a website that features only local businesses, e.g.,
62. The low likelihood that an Internet business will exclusively utilize other
Internet topographies limits the discussion in this section to businesses on the World Wide
Web. <http://yp.yahoo.com> (accessed Oct. 17, 2001).
63. It might be tempting to assume that any retailer that establishes a website is
determined to solicit a national audience. It may be more practical to go after the local
customers if a business is not prepared to deal with the volume. A local business cannot
realistically compete with national retailers on price. Instead, emphasizing the benefits of
shopping local or offering benefits to shoppers who come to the actual store can gain local
support. Tim McCollum, Corner Store.com, Industry Standard, (Apr. 17, 2000) (available
in LEXIS, Markets and Industry News) (describing a local retailer's 500% increase in web
business after targeting the website to locals).
64. See Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1180-81
(1st Cir. 1987).
local Chamber of Commerce websites." The content promoting local
businesses is of use primarily for those individuals who can take
advantage of these local services. Once the nexus between cyberspace
and realspace is bridged, the courts may have a harder time refining
the scope of territory covered. As the court in Hanover Star stated:
[S]ince it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be
protected, a trademark acknowledges no territorial
boundaries of municipalities or states or nations, but extends
to every market where the trader's goods have become
known and identified by his use of the mark."'
In the above-mentioned classified advertising example, it may be
impossible to gage from where the visits originate - from within the
city limits or outside. Perhaps the boundary may be demarcated
according to the distribution of the printed version. It may be
necessary and practical to rethink Hanover's rejection of per se
municipal boundary demarcations.
When a web business is targeted to a national audience, content
on a website is no longer useful as a nexus between cyberspace and
realspace. National-oriented websites can be determined by the
nature of the advertising and the geographic scope of sales.
Generally, the lack of local business content is as indicative of the
type of website involved (national or local) as the presence of
national products.
The first question presented at the beginning of this section is
difficult to answer. National-oriented websites and products must be
presumed to affect all geographic markets, but no one in particular.
The Internet is simply another widespread media outlet similar to
national magazines, but unlike geographically limited radio
advertisements. The analysis then immediately goes to the balancing
of evidence typically used to determine whether a reputation has
been established in cases involving national advertising.
2. Perambulating Customers
In traditional trademark analysis, the law affords greater
geographic coverage for trademarks that are associated with
consumers who are perambulating, or mobile. The law assumes that
65. For example, Yahoo! maintains a website that provides a "yellow page" service.
A particular town may be called up and local businesses are sorted by type of good or
service.
66. 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) (citing opinion below, 208 F. 513, 519).
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because the consumer of the business with the trademark is more
mobile than the typical consumer, the trademark reputation will be
carried farther away because the consumers are located farther away.
The primary examples are hotels and restaurants. The law essentially
focuses on the nature of the industry and the consumers who
purchase the goods or services.67
The issue brought on by the Internet is whether any industry
should be given more latitude in establishing trademark rights in a
particular geographic region simply because it maintains an active
presence on the Internet. The theory might be that the court might
give X amount of weight to a mark when deciding market penetration
for a particular market. However, if, because the mark is associated
with a particular industry, and that industry attracts more people on
the Internet than the average retail/wholesale good or service, then
the court should give this Internet presence more weight because the
average consumer is more likely to visit the site. For example, a mark
may have greater recognition for its association with electronics sold
on the Internet than its association with linen doilies. Although this
may be too complicated to parse into a standard for industry specific
goods or services, painting a broad picture may be useful.
3. Active Versus Passive Web Sites
Establishing territorial rights through reputation created via web
presence is a very real prospect, though hard to calculate. There are a
couple of issues that arise: (1) to what extent can courts weigh web
presence when determining in which trade markets a concurrent user
has established trademark rights via web-presence-generated
reputation where no other concurrent user has established itself; and
(2) what effect does web-presence-generated reputation have on the
competitor's trademark rights in a remote territory.
The first issue was discussed largely in Part II(A)(2). Regarding
the second issue, there have been no cases dealing with the degree to
which one company's website affects its restriction on entering
another company's realspace area. The reality is that even a passive
website makes the geographically-remote company known to
residents of the area in which a concurrent user has sole territorial
rights. This can happen when a consumer in the restricted territory
inadvertently discovers the trademark while surfing the Internet. The
same potential for consumer confusion exists when a consumer sees a
remote and confusingly similar trademark on a web page as one on a
67. See McCarthy, supra n. 7, at § 26:17.
billboard. A comparison of the degree and nature of confusion when
encountering similar trademarks on the Internet is discussed in Part
III. For present purposes, passive web presence is similar to a
company's advertising in national media and that advertising
penetrates the restricted area. Courts have held that owners of a mark
who advertised nationally, but were enjoined from a certain
geographic area, could continue to advertise nationally.68 The
reasoning of one of the courts is that consumers associate the source
of the trademark differently based on the methods of advertising. In
other words, there will not be a likelihood of confusion if the
trademark is used in the same trade market as long as the businesses
confine their advertising to different advertising methods and media.
This essentially short-circuits the concurrent use doctrine by
anchoring the analysis in a generalized assumption. Whereas the
typical likelihood of confusion test for trademarks assumes a small
chance of confusion still triggers infringement, here the courts are not
so picky.
Absolute restriction is not needed with regards to the web any
more than national advertising. Cases that allow marks in national
advertising to penetrate a restricted territory only via certain
advertising methods are splitting hairs very finely. It is fair to assume
that at least some confusion will result in a situation in which two
trademarks that are otherwise confusingly similar are suddenly not
confusing only because of the methods of advertising. This logic
seems to bode well for confusingly similar trademarks on the
Internet. Confusingly similar trademarks on the Internet are using the
same advertising method, so if courts are willing to give the
reasonably prudent consumer credit for not being confused due to
subtle differences in advertising methods, perhaps even more credit
should be given to reasonably prudent Internet users when sorting
out the different sources of confusingly similar trademarks.
Differences in website appearance, disclaimers, and information
regarding the location of the company are some examples of
characteristics that differentiate confusingly similar trademarks on the
68. See Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1974)
("The bare possibility that a potential customer.., might be misled by [an] advertisement
into thinking he could not obtain [the product] in Georgia and Florida is insufficient to
justify the punitive effect of an injunction construed to prohibit all national advertising.");
see also Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 438 Pa. 528, 539 (1970) ("If we barred
the Holiday Inn System from advertising within [the] twenty-two mile radius [of plaintiff's
hotel], we would, in effect, be enlarging Zimmerman's zone of protection by diminishing
the effective market area of the Holiday Inns which are outside that zone. This we will not
do.").
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Internet. 9 Similarly, a website will create at least some confusion in
the forbidden territory.
It is worth noting the treatment that passive websites have
received in personal jurisdiction cases. The courts have consistently
held that a website alone is not enough to confer personal jurisdiction
over the site owner.70 A website would put any foreign or domestic
website owner within the jurisdiction of any court in the United
States. This would diminish national and state sovereignty, almost
rendering past jurisdiction cases meaningless and stifle e-commerce.
If passive web presence alone results in a legal overlap of trademark
territories, the impact would not have the nefarious consequences as
would happen with the personal jurisdiction issue. However, this
treatment would render the present concurrent use case law an
endangered doctrine on the way to eventual extinction.
Should the concurrent use analysis treat differently active sites as
opposed to passive sites discussed above? Interaction with a website
is of course evidence of reputation, and especially useful if a visitor
can be connected to a particular geographic area. So the evidence
needed for establishing reputation would depend on technological
know-how.
C. Establishing Territorial Rights with the Zone of Expansion Test
1. Zone of Natural Expansion
The "zone of expansion" test may be too abstract and require
too much attenuation of logic. The geographic progress of realspace
businesses is traceable, and thus the amount and location of Internet
advertising is also traceable. However, it is not helpful for a court to
conclude that because company R advertises on websites Y and Z, it
is likely that company R will expand to realspace areas A and B. Less
abstract is the determination that because company R advertised on
local content (as opposed to national) websites X and Y (of close
realspace geographic location), it is likely that they are about to enter
the market of realspace location Z, located nearby. However, this is
still too abstract because of the lack of uniform representation on the
web by every geographic location. Further, although it is less abstract
to apply the "zone of expansion" test to "virtual" areas on the
69. For more information on the likelihood of confusion of a reasonably-prudent
Internet user, see infra Part IV.
70. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414; GTE New Media Serv. Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199
F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd on other grounds, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
Internet, the sheer number of business sites and restricted sites makes
it difficult to apply the test. It also more firmly puts the courts in the
position of fantasizing and guessing probable or improbable business
strategies and decisions. Therefore, the "zone of expansion" test
should be disregarded as unworkable.
IIl
Do Domain Names and Web Presence Eliminate the
Good Faith and Innocent User Defense?
The second important factor of the concurrent use test is whether
the subsequent user adopted the mark with knowledge about the
existence of the first user's mark. The Lanham Act establishes
constructive notice for nationally registered marks.7' The rationale
behind national registration providing constructive notice is to
extinguish the innocent use and good faith defenses.72 If the
Information Age is shrinking the element of geographical
remoteness, the courts must determine whether good faith can be
defeated in the absence of actual knowledge. This is necessary
because the purpose of the good faith analysis is to determine
whether the junior user is trying to capitalize on the goodwill of the
senior user's mark. Whereas national registration creates the
presumption that the junior user is aware of the senior user's mark,
then perhaps the Internet presence should also be factored into the
good faith analysis. It is important to note that in Rectanus, the Court
stated that neither party had any "knowledge or notice of the other's
trademark use."73 A majority of courts equate the absence of actual
notice with good faith, and no examination is done to determine
whether actions by the senior user, short of establishing common law
rights or registering nationally, will put the junior user on inquiry or
record notice. As will be discussed later, the courts might consider
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1946).
72. See Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 79, 81 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also
Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Comercio E Industria Ltd., 747 F. Supp. 122, 127
(D.P.R. 1990); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959);
Application of Beatrice Foods, 429 F.2d 466, 472 (Custom & Pat. App. 1970). A trademark
application will also provide constructive notice to subsequent users. See 15 U.S.C. §
1057(c).
73. 248 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).
74. As can be seen in the GTE Corp. v. Williams case, the defendant had heard of
General Telephone as an out-of-state business. 904 F.2d at 541. The court meshed the
actual knowledge and establishing common law rights analysis together. Id. at 541-42.
They eventually concluded that because there were no common law rights, no notice
existed even in the face of an admission that defendant had heard of another business. Id.
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applying a different standard to trademarks existing on the Internet.
There are two lines of decisions on the issue of notice. The first
requires that the junior user have no actual knowledge in order to
find the junior user adopted the mark in good faith.7 '5 The second
treats actual notice as weighing significantly in favor of determining
that there is no good faith use.7 '6 Actual notice, however, does not
automatically destroy the good faith defense."
It is difficult to determine actual confusion on the part of retail
customers,8 therefore the anarchistic order of the web makes this
even more difficult. There are numerous aspects of the Internet that
can potentially provide notice to subsequent users of a mark. The
following section discusses whether the following scenarios provide
notice, constructive or other forms of notice, to a junior user of a
trademark: (1) a registered domain name whose secondary level
domain consists solely of the trademark; (2) a registered domain
name whose secondary level domain contains the trademark
embedded in or with other words; (3) a trademark located in the
website URL path, but not the domain name; (4) advertising; and (5)
presence on different Internet topographies.
A. Domain Names as Notice
A brief explanation of Internet basics is required for a better
understanding of the following section. A domain name consists of
two parts: the top level and the secondary level ("sub-level") domain
Essentially, the analysis of good faith is much more a component of intent than of
knowledge. Id.
75. 'See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219,
1239-40 (D. Colo. 1976), modified, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
1052 (1978); see also Money Store v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1982);
Woman's World Shops, Inc. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
76. See Fry v. Layne-Western Co., 282 F.2d 97, 104 (8th Cir. 1960); see also Sci.
Applications, Inc. v. Energy Conservation Corp. of Am., 436 F. Supp. 354, 359 (N.D. Ga.
1977) ("[Dlefendant's assertion of good faith as a defense... is suspect after actual
notice.").
77. See Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978)
(concluding that actual and constructive notice of a registered mark did not destroy good
faith defense because the party was not aware of the other mark and it considered the
senior user's products to be unrelated); see also Accu Personnel, Inc. v. Accustaff, Inc., 823
F. Supp. 1161, 1170 (D. Del. 1993); Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., 166 So.2d
711, 712 (Fla. Dist. App. 1964); Architemps, Inc. v. Architemps, Ltd., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885
(S.D.N.Y. 1989);
78. See WE. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1970); see also
Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
909 (1953).
name. The top level domain name immediately follows the
secondary level domain name and it is comprised of the well-known
.com, .gov, .org, .edu, .mil, .int, .net, and a wide variety of two-letter
country codes, e.g., .uk (England), .dk (Denmark), and .ca (Canada). 0
The secondary level domain is the text immediately before the top
level domain. For example, "ibm" in www.ibm.com is the secondary
level domain name and the .com is the top level domain.'
Domain names are currently comprised of letters, numbers, and
dashes." This obviously limits the breadth of marks for which notice
can be obtained through domain names. Domain name registration is
maintained by several organizations that share the same database
from which new domain names are stored. This database is essentially
a central registry, which is analogous to the database used to maintain
active trademarks. Both databases are available for unpriced, on-line
searches. 3
While top level domain names cannot provide notice to a
subsequent user, a trademark used as the secondary level domain
name may succeed in notifying any subsequent user. The second level
domain is the important part of the domain name because it is
commonly associated with either the source of a product or the
product itself. The second level and top level domain names must be
registered with an organization that is licensed to do so. Once a
domain name is registered, the central database that keeps. track of
available domain names will identify the domain name as unavailable
to any subsequent individual searching for the same domain name.'
The same website also provides the name and address of the domain
name's owner. Searching for the domain name in this manner may
not be necessary. Any person wishing to find out whether a domain
name is taken may simply type the domain name into their Internet
browser and see if any website exists. It would be efficient for courts
79. G. Peter Albert, Jr. & Laff, Whitesel & Saret, Ltd., Intellectual Property Law in
Cyberspace 16 (BNA Books 1999).
80. The PTO has determined that the TLD adds nothing to trademark analysis. See
PTO, Registration of Domain Names <http://www.uspto.gov/web/uspto/info/
domain.html> (accessed Feb. 1, 2001).
81. Internet Council of Registrars, Substantive Guidelines Concerning
Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels I <http://www.gtld-
mou.org/docs/tracps.htm> (3d rev. draft, accessed Apr. 15, 2000).
82. Albert, Jr., supra n. 64, at 94-95.
83. See United States Patent and Trademark Office <http://www.uspto.gov>
(accessed Apr. 3, 2000); Network Solutions <http://www.nsi.com> (accessed Apr. 3, 2000).
84. This does not mean that the domain name is in use at all, merely that it has been
registered by another party.
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to require junior users to exercise a modicum of due diligence to
search for conflicting trademarks in a domain name since there is a
central registry, using an Internet browser is relatively simple, and it
is quite common for businesses to establish a website. A modicum of
due diligence is all that is needed where the trademark is only
comprised of text and is the only word in the secondary level domain
name.
The court in The Network Network v. CBS, Inc.85 implied that
Internet presence establishes notice. The plaintiff, The Network
Network ("Network"), sought a declaratory judgment against CBS,
Inc., the owner of The Nashville Network ("Nashville").86 Network
registered tnn.com.Y The court stated that
[r]egardless of when Nashville discovered that Network had
registered the domain name, it certainly should have been
aware of the existence of the Internet, of the practice of
registering domain names, and of the likelihood that an
existing organization with the initials TNN would seek the
most obvious domain name for its website. 8
Although the court does not state exactly the scope of who
should "be aware," the analysis appears to presume that businesses
are at least sophisticated enough to perform a domain name search
on the Internet. 89
There is also the added burden upon the searching party to
search for the trademark embedded within or coupled with additional
words in a domain name. For example, if the junior user seeks to
establish rights in the trademark "spade" in connection with
gardening tools, it may be too much to expect the junior user to
search the domain name database for more variations than the most
obvious: "thespadehardware.com," "spade-hardwares.com," or
"spadehardwarestore.com." While the domain name database may
contain numerous variations, there does not exist a service for the
public to search for such domain name variations. The junior user
would simply have to search by process of elimination, compiling a
85. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150 (C.D.Cal. 2000), available in 2000 WL 362016 at *4 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
86. Id. at 1151.
87. Id. at 1152.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. It is not a stretch to impose upon sophisticated individuals the same
presumption. After all, to say that a business is sophisticated is the same thing as saying
that individuals within that business are sophisticated.
list of every conceivable combination. The number of possible
combinations makes the search insurmountable. Assuming that
technology allowing a search of a trademark in any combination
becomes available, then a reasonableness standard may be in order.
After all, the more common the trademark, the more domain name
variations will be retrieved in a search. Hundreds of retrieved domain
names may be too many to provide notice.
The remaining portion of a web page address is the lower level
address, and it presents a greater problem for establishing notice.
First, some of courts have stated that the use of a trademarked name
in the path of a URL is not infringement of another's trademark.9° In
Patamont v. Gateway, the plaintiffs plead six different trademark
related claims after defendant used the plaintiff's protected mark
"Go-Ped" in the secondary level domain of the web address: (1)
trademark violation under 15 United States Code section 1114; (2)
common law trademark infringement; (3) false designation of origin
under 15 United States Code section 1125(a); (4) trademark dilution
under California Business & Professions Code section 14320; (5)
common law unfair competition; and (6) unfair trade practices under
California Business & Professions Code section 17200. 9' The court
granted summary judgment as to the claims because the use of "Go-
Ped" constituted nominative fair use.' The plaintiff failed to satisfy
the three part test set forth in New Kids on the Block v. News America
Publishing: (1) the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service; and (3) the user must do nothing that would,
in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark holder.9 More notably, the court stated that as a
matter of law the use of the mark in the secondary level domain
"does not suggest Patamont's sponsorship or endorsement because
the Go-Ped mark did not appear in the website's 'domain name.'
94
The court held that the assigned alphanumeric designation,
everything to the left of the first slash following the top level domain,
90. See Patamont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., 1997 WL 811770 (N.D.
Cal. 1997); PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Tech., L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
91. Patamont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., 1997 WL 811770 at *3.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *4 (citing New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publg., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1991)).
94. Id. at *4 n. 6.
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was by definition the domain name, while the text after the slash was
the "path" of the URL.95 Essentially, because the domain name is
associated with the source of the goods and the rest of the web
address is not, there is not going to be a likelihood of confusion.
This lower degree of protection for trademark owners may be an
acceptance of a limited type of concurrent use, but is it notice?
Assuming that an easy, low cost search of all web page addresses is
possible, it still may make little sense to attach notice to marks used in
the path of the URL. The Internet is growing at a rapid rate, thereby
flooding any searchable database with new addresses every day.
Outdated and defunct addresses are often retrieved by search engines
because the old addresses have not been deleted from the search
engine system. If the search retrieves any sequence of text, no matter
if the sequence falls within other words or between words, the sheer
volume of hits a search engine will find may be staggering, especially
if the text sought after is a common word.
There exists no central database that can search every path of
every website. As indicated earlier, the registering entities only
record the domain name. This renders the commercial use of a
trademarked name virtually hidden and undetectable from current
and publicly available technology.
National registration of a mark precludes the innocent user and
the good faith defense of any junior user because it provides
constructive notice to the junior user. The marks precluded from use
by a junior user are not only enforced against the exact same mark,
but against any confusingly similar or phonetically similar mark. The
junior user can argue that a diligent search was conducted or that
advice of counsel was followed. It obviously would be an
insurmountable obstacle to require the junior user to search for the
numerous variations of similar marks.
B. Web Site and Advertising s Notice
Although a website is a form of advertising, it is necessary to
differentiate between websites and other advertising methods when
discussing whether each provides notice. Information on the Internet
is in the public domain. The reality is that any reasonable or
exhaustive search for web pages containing a trademark that a junior
95. Id. The court distinguished the two by noting that the domain name indicates the
source of the origin; the path "merely shows how the web site's data is organized within
the host computer's files." Id. (citing The World Wide Web Unleashed 334-36 (John
December & Neil Randall eds., 1995)).
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user wants to use may still not locate the senior user's trademark
presence on the web. First, search engines are proven to get only a
small portion of the Internet. Second, Internet access exists only to
extent an individual can afford a computer or has access to publicly
available facility. Third, public domain materials like corporate filings
do not currently provide notice of any kind to junior users.
Whether or not the mark is in the public domain, it cannot at all
times be considered notice merely because it appears on the Internet.
The argument against trademarks appearing on the web constituting
notice appears strong. There are too many web pages not searched by
engines,96 and whether a web page containing the senior user's
trademark provides notice is entirely dependant on the percentage
chance that the web page will be found by search engines. No search
engine scours the entire web, even though a big part of the web can
be searched when using multiple search engines. Further, there is no
guarantee that the entire web has been searched when using multiple
search engines. There also exists the problem of the ever increasing
number of websites. There are estimated to be a minimum of two
million web pages added each day.97 The argument supporting the
notion that a senior user's trademark displayed on a web page should
provide some degree of notice is that there are dozens of search
engines, and it takes little effort to find many of the search engines.9"
The number of hits collected when searching for descriptive,
suggestive, or arbitrary marks can be decreased when the search
includes other search terms, e.g., another word describing the
product.
Even if the junior user of a mark searches the Internet using
multiple search engines, the user still faces the laborious task of going
through all the web pages that the engines retrieve. The number of
websites a search engine retrieves depends in part on the
commonality of the words used in the mark searched. Descriptive,
96. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Search Engines Fall Short, 285 Science (July 16, 1999) ("A
survey of the 11 most widely used search engines found that no single engine covered
more than 16% of the Web's contents, but scientists predict the search engines will catch
up as the Internet's growth slows down.").
97. Geoffrey Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farse, Am. Prospect (Jan. 1, 2001); see
also Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? <http://www.sims.
berkeley.edu/how-much-info> (accessed Feb. 1, 2001) (estimating that seven million web
pages are added to the Internet each day).
98. For example, a search on yahoo.com using the keywords "list" and "search
engines" pulls up numerous websites containing links to different search engines. Yahoo!,
Search Results for Search Engines <http://search.yahoo.com/search?p= search+engines>
(accessed Oct. 17, 2001).
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suggestive, and arbitrary marks comprised of a single word are likely
to result in an incredible number of web pages found. Word phrases
are likely to result in fewer hits, while fanciful marks may only result
in a few hits. Searching for a particular trademark being used by a
senior user is further complicated by the nature of how some search
engines operate. Many search engines place collected websites closer
to the top of the list of results according to how much the retrieved
website is willing to pay the search engine. This may bury a senior
user of a trademark far down on the list. Also, some web pages
contain the trademark within a picture file (a ".jpeg" or ".gif" file). If
this is the case, the search engine cannot identify the trademark
because the trademark is not individually identified by text or
keywords within a metatag. 9 The word is instead a picture composed
of colored pixels.1" Image recognition software exists, but current
search engines do not utilize this technology, and the computing
power necessary to find images is enormous. It will take a
sophisticated Internet user to conquer these problems.
Given the large number of websites, the unknown chance that a
website will be found by search engines, and the possibility that the
website will be far down the list of retrieved websites, to what extent
can a website provide notice to a junior user of a mark? The answer
does not lie in per se rules, instead this new Internet medium lends
itself to the same fact-sensitive analysis that is used with other
communication media, except more so. The presence of a mark on a
website or in a metatag does not readily make itself known as does
the trademark registry. For this reason, web presence cannot be said
to give constructive notice to subsequent users of a mark.
Inquiry notice may be too high a standard for descriptive,
suggestive, and arbitrary marks, but it may be fine for fanciful marks.
Because the varying commonality of descriptive, suggestive, and
arbitrary marks, some marks will undoubtedly be too common to
make any search effective. If the courts dare to construct a
sophisticated analysis, it almost demands that the courts engage in its
own search using a number of search engines. It would take little
effort to choose the ten largest search engines, according to an
99. The definition of a metatag is "HTML code that usually contains information on
the [web] page's contents and it is read by search engines indexing Web pages rather than
by the user itself." Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining. the Limits of Free-Riding in
Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 Gonz. L. Rev. 277, 280-81 (1997-
1998).
100. A pixel is a single point in a graphic image. Webopedia, Definitions and Links,
Pixel <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/p/pixel.html> (accessed Feb. 1, 2001).
objective determination, and search for the mark. The number of hits
effectively tells the courts how common the term is, which would help
the courts decide if the website provides inquiry notice. 1 Given the
unlikelihood that the courts will engage in searching the Internet on
its own, whether this means by the judges or special masters
appointed by the court, perhaps it will have to rely on affidavits
attesting to search results.
Advertising that appears on the Internet may be just as difficult
to sort through as web pages. Several unique situations arise
regarding the Internet. Trademark advertising may appear on the
web in three primary forms: banner ads, hypertext links, and
metatags.1° Hypertext links and metatags have essentially been dealt
with in the preceding paragraphs. The relevant issues for determining
whether banner advertisements provide notice are how widespread
the advertisements are and how readily can the banner
advertisements be located by search engines.
Trademarks can be embedded in permanent banner ads or they
can be embedded in particular banner ads that are triggered based on
the particular user that visits the site. That is, cookies 3 on the
visitor's computer are read by the host computer, and the past web
surfing activity will determine which ads the host computer will
display. Therefore, widely advertised trademarks may be viewed less
often than one might guess.
The difficulty in assuming that banner ads have been viewed by
any individual is that banner ads cannot be found by search engines,
and, as such, cannot play a role in a courts analysis on how likely a
mark or website will be found using search engines. Courts cannot,
101. It should be noted that when the court does the search, it should use those
search engines that an objective source indicates as the largest at that point in time. The
effectiveness of a search engine can vary from one year to the next, so one court's use of
X,Y, and Z search engines in Year One may be of little help to another court in Year Two.
In other words, there is little precedential value in the search engines used by a court. See
NET, A Search Engine's Value <http://www.cnet.com/search engines> (accessed Sept. 10,
2001).
102. Banner ads are graphical items that appear on a website. See Marketing Terms,
Banner Ads <http://www.marketingterms.hypercom/dictionary/banner-ad> (accessed
Sept. 14, 2001). Hypertext links are simply a name that appears as text in the body ofthe
website. See Webopedia, -Definitions & Links, Hyperlink <http://webopedia
.internet.com/Term/H/link.html> (accessed Sept. 14, 2001).
103. Cookies are text files "given to [the visitor's] web browser by [the host
computer] web server." Webopedia, Definitions & Links, Cookie <http://webopedia.
internet.com/TERM/c/cookie.html> (accessed Feb. 1, 2001). These text files contain
information about the visitor, typically information that the visitor has given to the host
computer when the visitor customizes a web page on the host computer's website. Id.
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however, ignore the fact that banner ads, like typical print media, can
generate a reputation. Widely advertised marks on national-oriented
websites will generate greater national reputation than local
websites." How do we know whether a locally targeted product
generates more reputation in a given area than a nationally targeted
mark? The court's only option is to treat local and national websites
like traditional media.
IV
A Not So New Analysis
There may be an easier analysis of the concurrent use doctrine in
cyberspace. A coherent concurrent use analysis can be pieced
together from a variety of Internet-related case decisions. Closely
related to the concerns surrounding the concurrent use doctrine is the
trademark infringement test itself: likelihood of confusion. Any
discussion of the concurrent use doctrine is academic if there is little
to no chance of being confused by the same or confusingly similar
trademarks on the Internet.' 5 A discussion of a modified likelihood of
confusion test for cyberspace precedes the discussion of. new
concurrent use analysis.
A likelihood of confusion standard for the ordinary Internet
consumer should involve a higher degree of evidence needed to show
confusion for three reasons: (1) the nature of the Internet may make
confusion less likely as to the source of the trademarked good or
service; (2) the sophistication of the average user is likely to be higher
than average; and (3) the ease of the analysis.
The nature of the Internet makes shopping and searching in
cyberspace very different than the traditional methods for which the
modern confusion test has been structured. Looking for just about
anything on the Internet inevitably involves using a search engine.
The average Internet user is surely aware of the high probability of
encountering many websites that have the words the user is looking
for, be it a product name or a particular business, even if they are not
relevant to the search. This realization will occur after the first several
searches because it is a commonplace that search engines get much
104. But then, if a company has spent a lot of money widely advertising on the
Internet, it may have spent money on traditional media types. If this is the case, the
Internet advertising seems to play a less significant role because the court can hang its hat
on the geographic specific areas of traditional advertising. See generally Marketing Terms
<http://www.marketingterms.com> (accessed Oct. 17, 2001).
105. This is different from domainname trademark issues, a topic not discussed by
this article.
more than the relevant material in a search. The average Internet
user then is at a minimum skeptical about the source of the
trademarked goods or services until they are sure it is the thing
sought after. °6
The nature of Internet searching is such that users encounter
such a wide array of businesses and products on the Internet, there
exists almost a "virtual identity" for a business. The way one does
business and advertises over the Internet is another experience
altogether than the methods traditionally used. Courts are beginning
to address this."0 For example, if there is a local business called
"Jacobs Hardware Store," and the average web consumer knows that
the Internet may be host to many businesses that are named "Jacobs
Engineering," or websites that contain both words in them, then the
likelihood of confusion is by definition less likely." The consumer
expects to fight to find the correct site. The nature of the Internet
forces one to be more inquisitive and certain that the website found
sells the items, or is the business sought. There is also contact
information regarding products and services offered. This further
gives the consumer notice about which store the consumer is dealing
with. This argument appears circular in that, because of the
confusion, the Internet consumer will need to be more inquisitive.
Perhaps the side effect of searching on the Internet is that the
106. See e.g. Brookfield Commun., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1057 ("In the Internet context, in
particular, entering a website takes little effort - usually one click from a linked site or a
search engine's list; thus, Web surfers are more likely to be confused as to the ownership
of a website than traditional patrons of a brick-and-mortar store would be of a store's
ownership.").
107. Recognizing this difference, at least one court has explicitly agreed with this
notion. See Bigstar Ent., Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 216 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) ("The manner in which products may be purchased on the web and the
requirements imposed upon prospective buyers cannot be overlooked, and must be
distinguished from generally prevailing norms associated with purchases of inexpensive
cash items at brick-and-mortar stores. The latter encompasses the entire population. It
takes no technical knowledge, level of education or sophistication or credit rating to place
a small cash amount for an inexpensive purchase over the counter. The web visitors who
decide to buy, on the other hand, include only those who have some level of sophistication
with the technology to be able to locate the product and the seller and who are generally
limited to purchasing only with credit cards or checks.").
108. The more generic the name, the less likely the consumer will be confused
because the consumer will know that they are commonly used. It is generally accepted that
where the purchase decision involves "careful consideration," there is less likelihood of
confusion. Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206 (1st
Cir. 1983); see Versa Prod. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1995) (dealing with
trade dress infringement, the court stated that the "greater the care and attention, the less
the likelihood of confusion" (quoting Fisions Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30
F.3d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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Internet consumer becomes more sophisticated due to the inherent
basic confusion that accompanies searching cyberspace."° This
sophistication required to search the Internet is not the same as the
average reasonably prudent consumer in realspace."0 Because courts
already classify the particular consumer depending on the product,
type of industry, and the nature of the buyer, it then stands to reason
that the "likelihood of confusion" standard can be raised for
"Internet consumers.""' The courts do not have a uniform definition
of the "reasonably prudent buyer, '1 2 so one might hope for a more
coherent "reasonably prudent Internet user.'. 3 And courts are not
necessarily bound to find infringement if there is confusion. They may
decide that a certain amount of confusion is tolerable given the
particular situation,"' and, in fact, courts do not assume the average
109. Planned Parenthood of America Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, 1439
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[The Court] note[s] that those with access to the Internet may not be
coextensive with the segment of the population to whom plaintiff normally offers its
services; those with Internet access may be more sophisticated."). The Court concluded on
the issue of Internet consumer confusion that "the sophistication of the user is no
guarantee, here, that the consumer will not be confused, I find that this factor is of limited
value in determining whether the consumer is likely to be confused." Id.; see also Toys "R"
Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Consumers looking at
defendants' web site are internet users and, presumably, sophisticated."); but see On-Line
Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[T]he TI'AB
noted that because of the broad proliferation of computer and Internet use, there is no
basis for concluding that Internet users are any more knowledgeable or sophisticated than
the general public.").
110. Cf. GOTO.COM, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Navigating amongst web sites involves practically no effort whatsoever, and arguments
that Web users exercise a great deal of care before clicking on hyperlinks are
unconvincing."). In GOTO.COM, the court addressed the actual effort needed to "click"
between sites, not the actual effort needed to find the site sought. Id.
111. This notion runs headlong at the new type of Internet confusion called "initial
interest confusion," which is typically associated with mistaking the source of a product
based on a trademark that is some another's domain name. This does not refer to site
content confusion. It also can be differentiated with the holdings of some courts that
sophistication of customers and search methods are not needed when searching for
domain names. See e.g. Paccar, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (quoting with approval Green Prod.
Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prod Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1079 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
("Internet users do not undergo a highly sophisticated analysis when searching for domain
names.")).
112. See McCarthy, supra n. 7, at § 23:92. Case law generally applies the same type of
consumer "class" distinctions to Internet buyers as is applied in traditional analyses, e.g.,
professional buyers. The discussion in the text concentrates on the nonprofessional class.
113. This author found only one case that uses the phrase "reasonably prudent
Internet user." See Bally Total Fitness Holding, Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
114. See CCBN.COM, Inc. v. C-CALL.COM, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass.
1999) ("Moreover, de minimus confusion, which is easily resolved, and does not affect the
ultimate purchase decision, is of minimal relevance."); Lang v. Retirement Living Publg.
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buyer is totally indifferent.'15
Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding confusion irrelevant where plaintiff
supplied no link between confusion and eventual purchase decision).
115. McCarthy, supra n. 7, at § 23:94 (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969), supplemental op., 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) ("A
reasonably prudent purchaser is expected to exercise that degree of 'care, caution and
power of perception' appropriate to the kind of choice he faces in the marketplace.")).
McCarthy goes on to cite W. W. W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co.. 984 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir.
1993) ([I]n considering the issue of likelihood of confusion, the court considers the
'general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally prevalent
conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying
that class of goods.') (emphasis added). It is clear that the courts can borrow the similar
reasoning from various circuits and fashion an Internet unique standard. But see Northern
Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 112-13 (D. Mass. 2000)
(noting that even though the court searched case law in vain for an applied Internet
unique standard, it applied the traditional test to the Internet consumers, who were a mix
of sophisticated and unsophisticated "Internet users"). The court did find that the
similarities between plaintiff's and defendant's websites resulted in a likelihood of
confusion. Id. at 113. The court implied in its hedging that an Internet standard may be
applicable. Id. at n. 18. Also interesting is the court's finding that one of the reasons that
made the sophisticated customer as such is the average number of years of Internet use
associated with the sophisticated customer: two years. Id. at 112. If this becomes part of
the analysis, then surely a presumption of greater average experience increases as time
goes on. If this is the case, then eventually this might force a higher Internet consumer
standard. But then, this may imply the point made in the above text that the a Internet
consumer becomes more inquisitive and certain about website content. The court in
Bigstar Ent., Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), considered
whether the web audience should:
encompass a representative cross-section of all who daily browse and
shop and otherwise navigate the Internet's wide-ranging services,
thereby spreading the base and skewing the curve downward to the level
of the least sophisticated? Or should the measure be taken by applying
the standard to a narrower, more targeted field? Given the ever
increasing reach of the Internet and the almost universal presence of
telecommunications, the market of relevant purchasers is indefinite.
Purchasers may transact business from home, the office and other
convenient places and reflect the full spectrum of the general population,
not only of the whole country, but indeed of the World Wide Web.
Id. at 185.
The court held:
In this Court's view, the relevant purchasers relied upon for purposes of
gauging sophistication in the Internet context should not encompass the
broad sweep of that general population. Rather the measure should be
circumscribed to the class of buyers who are prospective purchasers of
the parties' products, the same market audience of reasonably informed
and reasonably prudent consumers that serves as the base group by
which to test likelihood of confusion and the qualities or characteristics
relied upon to examine the strength of a trademark.
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If this is the case, and the virtual identity is a shield that adds a
layer of protection from likelihood of confusion, then perhaps in
trademark infringement cases the courts need only take a look at the
site itself and decide how easy it is for the consumer to figure out the
location and identity of the business. The courts may end up
fashioning remedies such as a link on the opening page that states
basic information about the company; such as, where it does business,
types of items sold, etc."'
Policy should err on the side of allowing confusingly similar
trademarks to exist on the web. Closing off this medium to
subsequent web page builders or trademark users would do more
harm than good. The good to be done is to spare the consumer from
confusion and trademark owners from diverted business.
A higher standard for Internet consumers would filter out many
concurrent use cases because, if there is no likelihood of confusion
between trademarks displayed in cyberspace, then there is no need to
determine the concurrent use of trademarks. Because finding a
geographic nexus may provoke endless analysis of differing websites
and a convoluted approach to the concurrent use doctrine, the courts
can dispense with the geographic remoteness requirement.
Geographic remoteness can be ignored, or more logically, it can be
presumed. The court is then left with the notice element of the
concurrent use doctrine. The courts would be left to decide whether
actual knowledge automatically spoils the junior user's ability to use
the mark, or whether some other level of "notice" is to be applied. Or
courts may impose a reasonably prudent Internet consumer or due
diligence test similar to the due diligence test already expected of
trademark investigations. This "duty to browse" makes the most
sense because the courts have begun to treat the Internet as a
medium sufficient to provide notice.' 7
Starting from the common sense examination of the extent to
which the Internet provides "notice" - not in the legal sense - to an
Id. at 215.
116. The courts have ordered web page modifications before allowing a disclaimer
defense.
117. But see Mediamatch, Inc. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 842, 853 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (stating that "the Court cannot say as a matter of law that plaintiffs should have
discovered the information on the web site through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
As plaintiffs' counsel pointed out, these plaintiffs are not in the technology field and had
no reason to be checking the web sites of the manufacturers of their office equipment.").
The court went on to state that it would decline "to rule as a matter of law, as defendants'
counsel proposed at oral argument, that the website posting was tantamount to the
traditional practice of national publication through the print media." Id. at n. 6.
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average person seems obvious. Quite simply, knowing precisely what
to look for does not mean a quick find. Before the advent of the
Internet, the trademark database was not readily available to
individuals for a quick, spontaneous inspection. And even then
registration was constructive notice after the Lanham Act was
enacted. The Internet is increasingly analogous to a database that
may be publicly inspected, albeit not completely."' Until search
engines can scour the entire Internet, perhaps a lower expectation
should be imposed on a junior user. A reasonably prudent consumer
standard would be a function of the extent to which a mark appears
on the Internet and the degree to which it is able to be found by
search engines. This analysis lends itself well to the current business
practices of tracking the number of web page hits, whether the visitor
linked to the site from another and which one; amount of time spent
on the website and which pages; and whether a banner ad was utilized
and by whom."1 A geographic component is too convoluted at this
stage of technological development.
V
Conclusion
The complexity, flexibility, and fast-pace speed of technological
innovation create conflicting incentives. On the one hand, the
complexity begs the court to draw legal lines so that there is stability
and predictability in the law. For example, the courts might establish
per se rules regarding commercial or noncommercial activity using
the web or Usenet newsgroups. The complexity, flexibility, and speed
of innovation also feeds on the lack of regulation. Courts meddling in
this area might find that a judicial pronouncement today is obsolete
and meaningless tomorrow. The courts will undoubtedly create
fictions to deal with the new Internet medium that defies the basis
upon which the concurrent use doctrine exists. The lack of a
geographic aspect to cyberspace suggests this will happen. There is
118. A court can easily determine which segments of the Internet are publicly
accessible. It should be noted that this may only be a temporary measure. The effort to put
as many public records online is moving at great speed. Search Us, Says Google, Tech.
Rev. 108, 113 (Nov. 2000) ("We are on a quest to build the ultimate search engine. We
think it will be a smart tool that understands exactly what you want, understands all the
information on the web, and then gives you the exact right thing. ... Recently we have
focused on making sure we have access to all the public information in the world.").
119. Courts already utilize evidence of number of "hits" a site can receive. "As of
August 18, 2000, the Plaintiffs' reported that the settlement website had received 48,088
'hits' and 13,043 claim forms had been downloaded." In re Motorsports, 112 F. Supp. 2d
1329, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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the very real possibility that courts may need experts in the field
simply to notify the court of the technological capabilities at that
present time. Special masters of the court may be necessary because
technological change and the complexity of technology are far greater
and faster than anything with which the courts have dealt with. The
speed at which technology is changing weighs against making per se
rules.' At the very least, courts "may, as part of its remedy, limit a
party's right to advertise [and] should ... consider the nature of a
[party's] product and marketing scheme in fashioning a remedy which
properly balances competing interests.'
121
There is good reason to believe that the current web address
system will not survive in its current form. The speed at which new
users are being added suggests that the shrinking pool of available
vanity addresses will constrain future web businesses. The vastness
and semi-chaotic nature of the Internet suggests that its architecture
will change, and for the most part the only direction of this change is
towards greater organization and ease of use.
Concurrent use of trademarks in the Information Age does not
require a new elaborate analysis. Notice should play the primary role
in a world of electronic boundaries. Analogizing Internet features to
realspace locations is not meaningless, but it is probably more trouble
than it is worth.
A common law search involves searching records other than the
federal register and pending application records. It may involve
checking phone directories, yellow pages, industrial directories, state
trademark registers, among others, in an effort to determine if a
particular mark is used by someone who has not filed for a federal
trademark. A common law search is not necessary but some find it
beneficial. Telephone numbers for search firms that perform these
searches for a fee can be found in the yellow pages of local phone
directories and through an Internet search.122
120. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 968
(C.D. Cal. 1997) ("The solution to the current difficulties faced by trademark owners on
the Internet lies in ... technical innovation, not in attempts to assert trademark rights over
legitimate non-trademark uses of this important new means of communication.").
121. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., 639 F. Supp. at 756.
122. For "Frequently Asked Questions About Trademarks" go to: <http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm>
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